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Public Policy and Aviation Liability Insurance

On July 12, 1969, a small private aircraft owned by Francis
and Bernice Thelen and piloted by Everett Pavitt took off from
Compton Airport near Los Angeles, California. Also on board
were three passengers, Ann, Robert and Edward Schroeder.
Almost immediately after take-off the plane plunged into the
ground killing Ann and Robert and seriously injuring Edward.
A home owned by Maurice and Della Carter was also damaged.
A wrongful death action was instituted against the Thelens and
Pavitt by the parents of the Schroeder victims and the Carters
brought an action to recover for the damage to their home.
A liability insurance policy on the plane involved in the
crash had been issued by National Insurance Underwriters
(hereinafter "National"). During the course of the subsequent
litigation, National filed a declaratory relief action to determine
the extent of its liability, if any. The California Supreme Court,
concluding that National had no liability under the policy, decided: (1) the policy expressly excluded coverage for permissive
users; (2) an exclusion of this type did not violate public policy;
and (3) exclusion of coverage for non-paying guest passengers
was not unconstitutional.'
The issue which drew most of the court's attention was
whether the policy issued by National excluded coverage for
permissive use. 2 One clause of the policy expressly provided
such coverage 3 but the court found that a subsequent exclusionary clause was controlling and therefore ruled that permis1. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 551 P.2d 362, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1976). This case may also be found at 14 Av. Cas. 17,267. The Court of
Appeal decision may be found at 116 Cal. Rptr. 88 and 13 Av. Cas. 17,311.
2. This was the only issue on which the court split, ruling 5-2 that the policy
had successfully excluded such coverage.
3. The unqualified work 'insured' wherever used in Part I of this
policy includes not only the Named Insured but also any person while
using or riding in the aircraft and any person or organization legally
responsible for its use, provided the actual use is with the permission
of the named insured. (emphasis original)
Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 390, 551 P.2d 362, 369, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 42, 49 (1976) (concurring and dissenting opinion, J. Tobriner).

sive users were not covered. 4 In reaching its conclusion, the
court determined that the exclusionary clause in question was
both clear and unambiguous and that the National policy was
therefore distinguishable from that involved in Gray v. Zurich
Insurance Co.5 It further determined that "an insurance company has the right to limit the coverage of a policy issued by it
and when it has done so, the plain language of the limitation
must be respected." 6 The majority additionally ascertained that
this interpretation corresponded with the "reasonable expecta7
tions of the insured" as to coverage.
The dissenting justices did not agree that the policy's exclusionary clause was clear and unambiguous. Pointing out that
the relevant language was found in three widely separated locations within the policy and that fine print had been used, the
dissent concluded that these provisions should not operate to
bar coverage.8 These justices also felt that the majority's interpretation of the policy frustrated the reasonable expectations of the insured because that construction completely ignored the insuring clause which expressly covered such use.
The defendants also contended that the Uniform Aircraft
Financial Responsibility Act 0 was unconstitutional because it
mandated insurance coverage for paying passengers but allowed for the exclusion of non-paying passengers. The argu4. The exact language of the excluding clause is set out at 17 Cal. 3d 380,
393-94 n. 2, 551 P.2d 362, 371 n.2, 131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 51 n.2 (concurring and
dissenting opinion, J. Tobriner).
5. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104(1966). Gray held invalid an
exclusion deemed to be hidden and ambiguous.
6. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 386, 551 P.2d 362, 366,
131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46 (1976) quoting from Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr.
Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 432, 296 P.2d 801, 806 (1956).
7. Id. at 396, n.6, 551 P.2d at 373, n.6, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 53, n.6.
The majority state that it is self evident that the Thelens could not have
reasonably expected National to afford coverage without regard to the
identity and qualifications of those persons entrusted with flying the
aircraft. The Thelens knew that National had agreed to provide coverage when the insured aircraft was piloted by Mrs. Thelen even though
she had only 20 flying hours and lacked any experience with the make
and model of aircraft in question. The Thelens thus could reasonably
expect that National would not withdraw coverage because the plane
was piloted by Pavitt, a permissive user with more experience and
better qualifications than either Mr. or Mrs. Thelen.
Additionally, "insureds... tend to equate aviation insurance with their automobile policy ... " E. JERICHO, INSURANCE COVERAGE VIOLATIONS 246, found in
SMALL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT LITIGATION; PHASE 11 (1975). The experience of the
Thelens with their automobile policy, which by law had to include coverage for
permissive use, would also lead them to expect coverage.
8. 17 Cal. 3d 380, 389, 551 P.2d 362, 368, 131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (Tobriner, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
9. Id. at 396, n.5 & 6, 551 P.2d 362, 373 n.5 & 6,131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 53 n.5 & 6.
10. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 24230-24410 (West Supp. 1976).
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ment that this distinction violated the defendants' equal protection rights was unanimously rejected by the court. The justices
determined that the Act did not require coverage for any passenger, whether paying or non-paying;" thus, since coverage for
both classes of passengers could be excluded, no equal protec12
tion violation existed.

Finally, the court also unanimously held that the Uniform
Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act did not evince a public
policy to forbid the exclusion of coverage for permissive users
in aviation liability policies. The balance of this Note will reexamine that determination and discuss the question of

whether the court should have declared such a public policy on
its own absent any legislative declaration thereof. 3

The plausibility of the court's making such a determination
in this case is raised because of its prior holding in Wildman v.
Government Employees' Insurance Co. 14 In Wildman, the
Court determined that the Automobile Financial Responsibility
Act 5 declared a public policy which prohibited insurers from
excluding coverage for permissive users of automobiles. 1 6 The
11. Defendants maintain, however, that this provision, and the exclusion therein contained, are impermissibly discriminatory since other
provisions of the Act require coverage for paying passengers. To the
contrary, we find nothing in the Act mandating such coverage.
17 Cal. 3d 380, 388, 551 P.2d 362, 368, 131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48.
12. The seed for this argument comes from CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 24350(b)
which requires coverage for injuries caused to those who are not passengers.
The Court concluded that these separate classifications had rational bases because passengers were aware of the risk they were undertaking while innocent
parties on the ground were not aware of nor could they control any risk.
13. [T]hree different situations may arise before a court: (1) The legislature has declared the public policy of the government positively and
unmistakably; (2) the legislature, though not declaring public policy in
unequivocal terms, has enacted statutory provisions from which a public policy may reasonably be inferred; or (3) the legislature has not
made known any preference, either by positive declarations or negative implications (inaction or silence).
Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formationof a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 323, 325 (1970-71). The instant case falls in either the second or third
category depending on one's point of view. Wildman v. Gov't Employees' Ins.
Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957) would seem to fall in the first category.
14. 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 (1957).
15. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 16000 et seq. (West 1966).
16. We are of the opinion that for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance which does not cover an accident which occurs when a person,
other than the insured, is driving with the permission and consent of
the insured is a violation of the public policy of this state as set forth in
Sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle Code. [sections 402 and 415 are now
sections 16450 and 17150 respectively].

obvious analogies between travel by automobile and travel by
air make it reasonable to expect that similar public policies
would govern each. 17 In rejecting this contention, the Court held
that the particular language used in former Vehicle Code Sections 402 and 415,18 which mandated such a policy, had no counterpart in the Uniform Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act.
At the time of Wildman, California Vehicle Code Section
402 read as follows:
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death
of or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in the
operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or
otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner, and the negligence of such
person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages.

California Vehicle Code Section 415 stated:
Requisites of Motor Vehicle Liability Policy.
(a)(2) Such Policy shall insure the person named therein and any
other person using or responsible for the use of said motor vehicle or
motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of said assured.

Admittedly, the Uniform Aircraft Financial Responsibility
Act has no express counterpart to former Vehicle Code Sections
402 and 415. However, Section 402 is paralleled in the State
Aeronautics Act: 19
Liability of the owner or pilot of an aircraft carrying passengers for
injury or death to the passengers is determined by the rules of law
applicable to torts on the land or waters of this state, arising out of
similar relationships. Every owner of an aircraft is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negliWildman v. Gov't Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39, 307 P.2d 359, 364 (1957).
The Wildman doctrine has received mixed acceptance by other courts. The
following cases have either expressly or implicitly accepted the doctrine:
Jenkins v. Mayflower Ins. Exch. 93 Ariz. 287, 380 P.2d 145 (1963); Sandoval v.
Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241, 428 P.2d 98 (1967); Lynch-Davidson Motors v. Griffin,
171 So. 2d 911 (Fla. App. 1965); Protective Fire and Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176
Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Inc. 223 Tenn. 80,442 S.W.2d 614 (1969); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975). Other cases have rejected the doctrine: Hart
v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 422 P. 2d 1015 (Alaska 1967); Pennsylvania T.&F.M. Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 233 Md. 205, 196 A.2d 76 (1963); Auto. Underwriters Inc.
v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 2d 159, 256 N.E.2d 46 (1970); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1960); Western Cas. and Sur. Co.
v. General Cas. Co. of Wisconsin, 200 N.W.2d 892 (1972); Greene v. Great American Ins. Co. 516 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.). For a more complete annotation see
8 A.L.R.3d 388.
17. This seems especially true in light of the parallel treatment given aircraft and automobiles in the Court of Appeal ruling on the constitutionalty of
the aviation guest statute. See e.g. Ayer v. Boyle, 37 Cal. App. 3d 822, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 636 (1974).
18. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 405 and 415, now §§ 16450 and 17150. (West Supp.
1976).
19. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21001 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
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gent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the aircraft, in the
business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating
20
the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.

However, there is no statute which specifies that an aviation
liability policy "shall insure the person named therein and any
other person using or responsible for the use of the aircraft with
the express or implied permission of said assured" as Section
415 does for automobile policies. In the absence of such language and, in light of the traditional reluctance of courts to
determine public policy absent express legislative declaration
thereof, the Court's holding in the instant case is understand21
able.
Even absent language similar to that found in the Automobile Financial Responsibility Law, the Court had the option
of declaring that the exclusion of coverage for permissive users
of aircraft violated public policy if it had determined that such
policy of express law, alan exclusion was "contrary to the
'22
though not expressly prohibited.
The broad policy behind the enactment of the Uniform Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act was to "establish minimum
standards for aircraft financial responsibility" 23 and to lessen
"the toll of aircraft accidents upon third party victims who...
may suffer personal injury or property loss and who have neither foreknowledge of flights of small aircraft, nor opportunity
to assess the risks and insure against them. ' 24 "Such a law is
remedial in nature and in the public interest is to be liberally
construed to the end of fostering its objectives. '25 The question
thus becomes whether a liberal construction of the Act would
impliedly evidence a policy prohibiting the exclusion of cover20.

CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

§ 21404. The amount of this liability is limited,

however, by CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21404.1. See also, Nachsin v. Bretonne, 17
Cal. App. 3d 637, 95 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971).

21. See, 1 WITKIN

SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW

§ 373 (8th ed. 1973) and cases

cited therein. See also, 12 CAL. JUR. 2d, Contracts § 79 (1963), and 14 CAL. JUR. 3d,
Contracts § 122 (1974). See also, Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formationof a
Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 323 (1970-71).
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 (West 1964); Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d
414, 417, 322 P.2d 548, 550 (1958).
23. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 24410 (West Supp. 1976).
24. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 388, 551 P.2d 362, 368,
131 Cal. Rptr. 192, 198 (1976).
25. AAS v. Avemco Ins. Co., 55 Cal. App. 312, 322, 127 Cal. Rptr. 192, 198
(1976). This case may also be found at 13 Av. Cas. 18,421.

age for permissive users of aircraft.2 6
Section 24351 of the Act delineates those coverages which
are not required in an aircraft liability policy or bond.27 Significantly, protection for permissive users is missing from that list

of coverages which may be excluded. The logical implication of
this provision is that coverage is required for all purposes not

exempted and, therefore, coverage for permissive use must be
included in all aviation liability policies in this state. Certainly,
this provides at least an arguable legislative expression of policy requiring coverage for permissive use. When this expression
is viewed in light of the policy considerations behind the Act, it
would seem that the Court both could and should have interpreted the law to protect the innocent victims of aviation accidents.2 8
The primary impediment to the Court's deciding to so act is
found in California Insurance Code Section 11584.29 That statute reads in pertinent part:
This section does not prohibit the use of specific exclusions or conditions in any such aviation policy which relates to any of the following:
(4) Establishing limitations on the use of the aircraft.

The inference, if not the clear statement of this section, is that
insurers may exclude coverage for permissive users because
flight by them relates to "use of the aircraft". 30 This construction of the statute is clouded by two factors. First, the statute
only states that it does not prohibit exclusions limiting the use
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 (West 1973). Vick v. Patterson, 158 Cal. App. 2d
414, 417, 322 P.2d 548, 550 (1958).
27. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 24351 (West Supp. 1976) states:
The policy or bond need not cover:
(a) Any liability on account of bodily injury to or death of any employee of the owner or operator while the employee is engaged in the duties
of the persons employment.
(b) Any obligation for which the owner or operator or the insurer of the
owner or operator may be held liable under any workman's compensation law.
(c) A guest, or any other person, riding in or upon any aircraft without
giving compensation.
28. It is an elusive argument to maintain that the courts have no right
to declare public policy because the legislature has failed to do so. The
default of one branch of the government is hardly a reason to suggest
that another branch should likewise refrain from acting. Moreover, the
legislature remains in command. If the view of public policy expressed
by the court is not acceptable, the legislature may speedily revise the
expression by appropriate statutory provision.
Hopkins, Public Policy and the Formationof a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 331 (1970-71).
29. CAL. INS. CODE § 11584 (West 1972).
30. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 116 Cal. Rptr. 88 (District Court of
Appeal, 1975).
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of the aircraft. It says nothing about limitations on exclusions
which may exist in other statutes. Second, the statute refers to
use of the aircraft, not to the user thereof. It is arguable that this
language refers to limitations in insurance policies which may,
for example, exclude coverage for use at night or use to and
from certain or otherwise dangerous airports without refering
to who the user is. Under this construction the statute may say
nothing at all about excluding coverage for certain individuals.31 Because of the varied interpretations to which it might be
subject, the statute can hardly be deemed to be a clear expression by the legislature that aviation insurance policies may allowably exclude coverage for permissive users.
Assuming, as the court did, that no expression of public
policy may be gleened from the Uniform Aircraft Financial
Responsibility Act or from other related statutes, it is still necessary to examine the possibility that the court might have announced such a policy on its own.
It is primarily the prerogative of the legislature to declare what contracts and acts are unlawful and against public policy. But courts,
following the spirit and genius of the law, written and unwritten, may
declare void as against public policy contracts which, though not in
terms specifically forbidden
by legislation, are clearly injurious to the
32
interests of society.

Courts can and do declare public policy. 33 "Anything which

has a tendency to injure the public welfare is in principle,
against public policy. ' '34 Under this definition it seems reason-

ably clear that an insurance contract which excludes permissive
users from its coverage has a tendency to injure the public
welfare. Those injured by the uninsured will often be cared for
at the expense of society at large. Minors orphaned when an
uninsured permissive user is responsible for the death of their
parents might become charges of the state. The conclusion is
inescapable that situations such as these fall within the broad
ambit of that which public policy should seek to prevent.
The Supreme Court has declined to take advantage of a
31. This statute has never been clearly interpreted.
32. 12 CAL. JUR. 2d, Contracts § 79 (1963). See also, 14 CAL. JUR. 3d, Contracts § 122 (1974) and 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 373 (8th ed. 1973).
The leading California case is Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 71 Cal.
App. 492, 236 P. 210 (1925).
33. Grimes v. Allen, 93 Cal. App. 2d 653, 656, 209 P.2d 651, 653 (1949).
34. 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAW § 373 (8th ed. 1973).

unique opportunity to protect the interests of society. 35 Had it
done so, the insurance companies could not complain that the
court exceeded its authority or that its decision was unprecedented. Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance Co.

had put them on notice twenty years earlier. "[W]here the precise question as to whether or not a particular agreement is
against public policy has not been determined, analogous cases
involving the same general principle may be looked to by the
courts in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. ' 36 Insurers would
have been forewarned by the passage of the Uniform Aircraft
Financial Responsibility Act in which a legislative concern for
37
those injured by aircraft accidents was demonstrated.
As long as insurance companies draft adhesion contracts

which evidence the "practice of building into policies one condition or exception upon another in the shape of a linguistic tower
of Babel" 38 there will be a need for the courts to declare that
such practices cannot violate the interests of society at large. In
this decision the court has declined to afford judicial protection
to policy holders who, as laymen, might not comprehend complicated insurance contracts. It has further declined to protect
innocent third party victims "who have neither foreknowledge
of flights of small aircraft, nor opportunity to assess the risks
and to insure against them."39 It seems clear that the Legislature
must now act to protect California's citizens.

WILLIAM

E. GIBBS

35. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 71 Cal. App. 492, 236 P. 210
(1925). See, 17 AM. JUR. 2d, Contracts § 177 (1964) which states:
What the public policy is must be determined from a consideration of
the federal and state constitutions, the laws, the decisions of the courts,
and the course of administration, not by the varying opinions of
laymen, lawyers, or judges, as to the demands of the interests of the
public. From these principles the conclusion has been derived that in
determining the public policy of a state, courts are limited to a consideration of the statutes, the constitution, the judicial decisions, and the
practice of government officers. But if this statementmeans that there
must be a precedent to warrant every judicial declaration that a
contract is againstpublicpolicy, it unquestionably embodies too rigid
a rule. (emphasis added)
36. 17 AM. JUR. 2d, Contracts § 177 (1964).
37. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 388, 551 P.2d 362, 368,
131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (1976).
38. Ins. Co. of North America v. Electric Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679,
691, 433 P.2d 174, 182, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390 (1967).
39. Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Carter, 17 Cal. 3d 380, 388, 551 P.2d 362, 368,
131 Cal. Rptr. 42, 48 (1976).

